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Abstract 
Bush v. Gore was decided a year ago.  As expected, it evoked a flood of 
journalistic and academic commentary.  The present authors write to 
express dissatisfaction with the resulting literature.  They find it in general 
to be dominated by the usual political discourse conducted from opposite 
ends of the usual political spectrum, with both ends sharing an assumption 
that the Supreme Court was animated in its decision by the usual political 
motives that it has become conventional to see in the actions of that 
institution.  Left almost completely out of view have been the more 
personal selfish motives of the Justices that seem to the present authors to 
be obvious, unusual, and paramount.  Those motives and the reluctance of 
others to comment on them are here taken to suggest that neither the Court 
nor its supporters or critics are seriously concerned, as these authors are, 
with the continuing decline of the right to self-government that is 
dramatically marked by yet another decision by Justices who demean the 
authority of elected officials. 
Form of Publication 
The authors have chosen this form of publication for two reasons.  First, 
they are mindful that they are late in entering a discussion and that those 
aspects of the topic seeming to them to be of the greatest importance have 
been largely neglected in that discussion.  By publishing electronically, 
their views can be presented a year earlier than they could be presented in 
conventional print media.  Second, the authors hope to evoke comments 
from academic colleagues, lawyers and judges, and others interested in 
reflecting on the Court’s disposition.  Accordingly, anyone patient enough 
to read this brief paper and react to it is assured that their comments will be 
equally available to subsequent readers.  This also permits us, if the 
occasion arises, publicly to acknowledge the force of new information or 
arguments that may be advanced by our readers.  It is our hope that this 
format, or enhancements of it, will prove to be useful to other authors of 
other papers who seek to engage in public debate without the delays 
attending traditional forms of publishing.  Readers who wish to participate 
in the discussion may visit http://www.law.duke.edu/pub/selfgov/. 
No Copyright 
This paper is dedicated to the public domain.  If readers find it 
useful to repeat any part of it, it would be a professional courtesy to cite the 
present authors, but no property right is claimed. 
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With reluctance, we add our 
voices to the academic clamor over Bush 
v. Gore.1   We do so because we are 
distressed that so much of that clamor has 
been predictable on the basis of the 
political alignment of the authors, whether 
they be among those dismissed by Chief 
Judge Richard Posner as “liberals” who 
want a Court to do their ideological 
bidding2 or whether like the judge himself 
they seem to be ideological allies of the 
majority of the Court defending the 
decision with reckless disregard for the 
transparency of their arguments. 
Critics and defenders of the Court 
alike have supposed that the Justices were 
motivated by conventional political 
instincts, selecting a President whose 
political ideology was closer to their own 
and repaying political debts to those who 
had conferred so much honor and power 
on them by appointing them to the Court.  
We do not share that suspicion.  We have 
confidence that all nine members of the 
Court when deciding cases are able to lay 
aside their ideological preferences among 
candidates for public office and that none 
would repay their private debts from 
public stock. 
                                                     
1  There were really three cases that 
are the object of attention:  Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 
(Dec. 4, 2000) (vacating Florida Supreme 
Court’s initial decision and remanding for 
clarification); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 
(Dec. 9, 2000) (staying the recount ordered by 
the Florida court); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(Dec. 12, 2000) (reversing the Florida court’s 
recount decision). 
2  BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 
2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 150-189 (2001). 
We perceive, however, that the 
professional integrity of the Court was 
subverted by a form of self-interest much 
more powerful than mere ideology, one 
seldom noted in the literature and one that 
all the Justices should have recognized as 
disqualifying them from sitting on such a 
case.  That interest is their own personal 
status and power. 
Each Justice has a direct personal 
interest in the identity of the person who 
will appoint his or her colleagues.  
Particularly for members of a Court as 
evenly and constantly divided as the 
Rehnquist Court, a single unwelcome 
appointment would demote the five in the 
majority from the power to decide the 
Court’s important cases to the impotence 
of dissent.  Nothing save death or serious 
illness could be a more distressing 
prospect to a Justice sitting in the majority 
of such a Court.  In like manner, a single 
welcome appointment would promote the 
four in the minority from a position of 
perpetual impotence to a position of 
gratifying power.  Nothing, not even a 
large cash bequest, could be a more 
welcome prospect to a Justice sitting as a 
member of a frustrated minority.  If there 
were ever a case in which the Court 
should have refused to exercise 
jurisdiction, Bush v. Gore would seem to 
us to be it.  That they did decide it should 
have occasioned their denunciation on all 
sides, but there have been only a few 
polite murmers about this aspect of the 
case. 
That all the Justices were 
disqualified from sitting on the case is, 
however, only one element of our protest.  
The additional point we wish to make is 
that not only the self-aggrandizing 
decision in Bush v. Gore, but much of the 
commentary by both friends and foes 
expresses or at least reflects a chronic and 
growing disrespect for the institutions of 
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self-government.  The ends of the 
political spectrum appear to us to be 
united in their unseemly enthusiasm for 
what has become known as the Court’s 
counter-majoritarianism. 
We would like to be reassured 
that members of the Court and of its 
academic audience can recall the prose of 
Jefferson in the Declaration.3  Or of the 
Framers in the Preamble.4  Or of Lincoln 
at Gettysburg.5  Or that any have read 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and considered its possible 
application to citizens of the United 
States.6  It seems to us that the Court has 
for some time lost touch (if it was ever 
really in touch) with its responsibility for 
the nurture and protection of 
representative government and has 
acquired the habit of deciding just about 
any interesting question that comes its 
way with little or no regard for the 
preferences of those who were elected to 
decide them.  It thus appears to us to 
present inadequate respect for the other 
branches of the federal government, or for 
the institutions of state and local 
government.  Bush v. Gore should be 
                                                     
3 . . .  That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their power from the consent of the 
governed. 
4  We the People of the United States 
. . . do ordain and establish this Constitution. 
5 . . . We resolve . . . that government 
of the people, by the people, and for the 
people shall not perish from the earth. 
6 . . .  The will of the people shall be 
the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
taken, as it has not been, to dispel the 
illusion that the judiciary is “the least 
dangerous branch.” 
Believing as we do in the wisdom 
of the rhetoric noted and in the right of 
citizens to govern through elected 
representatives, we hold that the 
ubiquitous and most important duty of the 
Supreme Court of the United States is to 
mind its own business and respect the 
roles of other institutions of government.  
Its complete failure to perform that duty 
in Bush v. Gore is the cause of our 
disappointment.  It also disappoints but 
does not surprise us that Judge Posner, the 
author of a book about the importance of 
Overcoming Law in order to reach 
gratifying results, should see nothing 
terribly wrong about the Court’s disregard 
of controlling legal texts and traditions to 
spare the nation a period of uncertainty 
about the outcome of the election.  With 
regret, we take his point that many of the 
Court’s critics have long espoused an 
expanded political role for the Court to 
which the decision in Bush v. Gore can be 
seen as a suitable response.  We cannot 
deny that the admirers of Justice William 
Brennan on and off the Court have indeed 
“overcome law” in the belief that the 
Justices could and should make up for any 
shortfall in the humanitarian impulses of 
other “majoritarian” branches and 
elements of American government, a 
competence that we and some others 
deny.  By “overcoming law” with 
impugnity, they have contributed mightily 
to the sad state of representative 
government in America. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
in the days when he was a fulminating 
dissenter to the Brennan Court cautioned 
his brethren against the ubiquitous 
temptation to exceed their authority by 
quoting John Stuart Mill: 
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The disposition of mankind, 
whether as rulers or fellow citizens, 
to impose their own opinions and 
inclinations as a rule of conduct for 
others, is so energetically supported 
by some of the best and some of the 
worst feelings incident to human 
nature, that is hardly ever kept 
under constraint by anything but 
want of power.7 
Alas that the Chief Justice was unable to 
restrain himself in Bush v. Gore.  No 
doubt he rationalized his decision as a 
manifestation of his better “feelings,” but 
that should not conceal the nature of his 
act from others who understand political 
power and its malign effects on those who 
possess it, whatever their political 
persuasion. 
Our keenest disappointment, 
however, is with the performance of 
Justice Antonin Scalia, who has long and 
ardently presented himself as an advocate 
of the self-restraint required by judges 
participating in a republican form of 
government.  We therefore first review 
his utterances of principles with many of 
which we are in agreement.  We will then 
measure his performance in Bush v. Gore 
against the standards he has proclaimed 
for himself and others, taking separately 
his votes for the per curiam opinion of the 
Court, the concurrence in which he 
joined, and the order staying further 
counting of the votes. 
                                                     
7  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
467 (1971) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quoting 
Mill, On Liberty 28 (1885). 
JUSTICE SCALIA ON THE RIGHT TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 
“I take the need for theoretical 
legitimacy seriously,” Scalia wrote in a 
1989 article, and he has repeatedly (and 
correctly in our view) linked the issue of 
judicial legitimacy with his understanding 
of “the nature and purpose of a 
Constitution in a democratic system.”8  
“The courts of the United States derive all 
their power from an instrument (the 
United States Constitution) which begins: 
‘We, the people of the United States . . .’  
It is quite impossible for the courts, 
creatures and agents of the people of the 
United States, to impose upon those 
people of the United States norms that 
those people themselves (through their 
democratic institutions) have not 
accepted.”9  The fundamental principle of 
American constitutionalism according to 
Justice Scalia is “the eminently 
democratic principle that --except where 
constitutional imperatives intervene— the 
majority rules.”10 
For Justice Scalia the overriding 
desideratum of a theory of constitutional 
interpretation was said to be to enable 
courts to carry out their limited function 
of safeguarding justiciable constitutional 
imperatives while ensuring that judges do 
not trespass on the broad grounds of 
legitimate democratic decision-making by 
substituting their own policy preferences 
                                                     
8  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 
(1989). 
9  Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1119 (1996). 
10  California Democratic Party v. 
Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
for the Court). 
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for those of political actors.  This is no 
easy task, Scalia admits: “Now the main 
danger in judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution--or, for that matter, in 
judicial interpretation of any law--is that 
the judges will mistake their own 
predilections for the law.  Avoiding this 
error is the hardest part of being a 
conscientious judge; perhaps no 
conscientious judge ever succeeds 
entirely.”11  It is fair to assume, we 
believe, that Scalia’s frequent statements 
of interpretive principle reflect his belief 
that both he and his colleagues are at risk 
of committing this anti-democratic error 
and are less likely to succumb to 
temptation the more clearly they keep 
before them the proper approach to 
interpretation. 
Justice Scalia has identified two 
general principles of constitutional 
interpretation that, taken together, he 
believes capable of guiding judicial 
review in a manner respectful of 
democratic prerogatives.  The first of 
these is adherence to the plain meaning of 
a controlling text.12 
But of course meaning is often 
less than plain.  Where the text is cast in 
terms of great generality, this invites even 
a judge wishing to be conscientious about 
respecting democracy to read into the 
provision “notions of fairness or textual 
fidelity”13 that were not in fact endorsed 
by the democratic processes conferring 
legitimacy on the text.  The Due Process 
                                                     
11  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 863. 
12  Id. 
13  Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards 
of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 581, 589 (1990). 
and Equal Protection Clauses are obvious 
examples of such provisions. 
When enforcing those provisions, 
Justice Scalia asserts that the Court cannot 
identify and protect against the political 
process an individual right that “is not to 
be found in the longstanding traditions of 
our society, [or] logically deduced from 
the text of the Constitution.”14  The Court 
must then, he tells us, give determinative 
weight in such cases to what he often calls 
tradition.  “The distinction between what 
is needed to support novel procedures and 
what is needed to sustain traditional ones 
is fundamental;” a practice that “is one of 
the continuing traditions of our legal 
system ... define[s]” what due process and 
equal protection meant and, thus, mean.15  
Challenges to traditional practices are to 
be answered “on the basis of the ‘time-
dated’ meaning of equal protection in 
1868;” adherence to practices that were 
accepted at the time the amendment was 
adopted “does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because that is not what 
‘equal protection of the laws’ ever 
meant.”16  The “‘time-dated’” historical 
                                                     
14  Ohio v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
15  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 
U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion of 
SCALIA, J.).  Burnham was a due process case.  
Justice Scalia has endorsed the same approach 
to equal protection issues.  In addition to the 
quotation in the text, see, e.g., J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156-163 
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568-69 (1996) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) 
16  Scalia, Response, in ANTONIN 
SCALIA ET AL., A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 148-49 (1997).  Justice Scalia’s remarks 
were an amplification of his earlier assertion 
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meaning of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses thus takes priority over 
the meaning that a Justice might ascribe 
to the text in the abstract on the basis of 
his or her “notions of fairness or textual 
fidelity.” 
The Scalia votes in Bush v. Gore 
were dramatic departures from these 
principles.  The plain meaning of the 
constitutional text of Article II and the 
“time-dated” meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause both pointed, beyond 
question it seemed to us, in the direction 
opposite to that taken by him.  We would 
especially welcome enlightenment from 
                                                                     
that what constitutes a denial of equal 
protection on the basis of sex is fixed by the 
meaning of the fourteenth amendment “when 
it was adopted.”  See Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System, in id. at 47.  
(Scalia was responding to Professor Ronald 
Dworkin’s criticism that Scalia’s “time-dated” 
interpretation of the equal protection clause 
“reads into that language limitations that the 
language ... cannot bear.”  Dworkin, 
Comment, in id. at 126.)  Scalia responded 
that Dworkin “quite entirely mistakes my 
position. ...  Denial of equal protection on 
[various grounds including sex] is prohibited – 
but that still leaves open the question of what 
constitutes a denial of equal protection.” 
Is it a denial of equal protection on the 
basis of sex to have segregated toilets 
in public buildings, or to exclude 
women from combat?  I have no idea 
how Professor Dworkin goes about 
answering such a question.  I answer it 
on the basis of the “time-dated” 
meaning of equal protection in 1868.  
Unisex toilets and women assault 
troops may be ideas whose time has 
come, and the people are certainly free 
to require them by legislation; but 
refusing to do so does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because that 
is not what “equal protection of the 
laws” ever meant. 
readers who think they can reconcile his 
self-serving votes with his previous 
rhetoric regarding the proper role of the 
Court as one feature of a democratic 
government. 
THE PER CURIAM OPINION OF THE 
COURT: “TIME-DATED” MEANING 
We consider first his vote in 
support of the per curiam opinion of the 
Court.  Justice Scalia was one of seven 
Justices holding that the decision of the 
Florida Supreme Court calling for a hand 
recount of the undervote was a denial of 
Equal Protection of the Law because that 
court failed to specify detailed standards 
as to how that recount was to be 
conducted, thus leaving open the 
possibility that between two identical 
ballots one might be counted and the 
other not because those doing the 
recounting were applying different 
standards. 
Unaccountably to us, none of the 
parties or amici in Bush v. Gore briefed 
the question of the historical 
understanding of ballot counting and 
Equal Protection in 1868, although Vice 
President Gore’s lawyers did note, 
correctly, that the Florida court’s general 
“intent of the voter” standard, which the 
state court drew from the Florida election 
code,17 was well within the mainstream of 
current and longstanding practice in many 
states.18  This failure of proof ought itself 
                                                     
17  “No vote shall be declared invalid 
or void if there is a clear indication of the 
intent of the voter as determined by the 
canvassing board.”  Fla. St. § 101.5614, cited 
in Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
18  See Brief for Respondent Albert 
Gore, Jr., Bush v. Gore, at 44-46. 
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to have made it problematic at best for 
Justice Scalia to join an opinion resting on 
the Equal Protection argument.  In other 
contexts involving broadly stated 
individual rights provisions he has made it 
clear that the burden of persuasion rests 
on the party seeking to read into the 
provision a specific limitation.  “For if the 
Constitution does not affirmatively 
contain such a restriction, the matter . . . is 
left to state constitutions or to the 
democratic process.”19  State action – at 
                                                     
19  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 976 n.6 (1991) (Scalia, J., for the Court).  
The specific context was a disagreement 
between the majority and Justice White in 
dissent whether the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the eighth amendment 
imposes a general requirement of 
proportionality between crime and 
punishment.  White argued that the clause 
does, in part because he found no evidence of 
“an [original] intention to exclude [such a 
requirement] from the reach of the words that 
otherwise could reasonably be construed to 
include it.”  Id. at 1011 (White, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia replied that White’s argument 
“[s]urely [was] an extraordinary method for 
determining what restrictions upon democratic 
self-government the Constitution contains.” 
It seems to us that our task is not 
merely to identify various meanings 
that the text “could reasonably” bear, 
and then impose the one that from a 
policy standpoint pleases us best. 
Rather, we are to strive as best we can 
to select from among the various 
“reasonable” possibilities the most 
plausible meaning. We do not bear the 
burden of “proving an affirmative 
decision against the proportionality 
component,” ibid.; rather, Justice 
WHITE bears the burden of proving an 
affirmative decision in its favor. For if 
the Constitution does not affirmatively 
contain such a restriction, the matter of 
proportionality is left to state 
constitutions or to the democratic 
process. 
least state action that is not (in Justice 
Scalia’s view) a per se violation of the 
Constitution20 – supposedly enjoys for 
Scalia a genuine presumption of 
constitutionality, a presumption that he 
did not apply in Bush v. Gore. 
Our disappointment in Justice 
Scalia’s decision to join the per curiam 
opinion deepens when we turn from 
presumptions regarding traditional 
practice to substance.  Even without the 
assistance of counsel, Scalia or his clerks 
could easily have discovered (as one of us 
                                                                     
Id. at 976 n.6.  See also City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (meaning of free exercise clause); 
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (meaning of due process clause).  
We are aware of nothing written by Justice 
Scalia suggesting that he would endorse a 
different approach to the equal protection 
clause. 
20  Justice Scalia’s position on race-
based affirmative action is presumably an 
example of a per se violation of the text of the 
equal protection clause, since his views are 
inconsistent with, among other matters, the 
apparent original understanding of the clause.  
Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment) with 
Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE 
L.J. 427, 427 (1997) (“Congress in the 1860s 
repeatedly enacted statutes allocating special 
benefits to blacks on the express basis of race 
(and I am not referring to the well-known 
Freedmen's Bureau Acts, which did not rely 
on express racial classifications). Accordingly, 
to be true to their principles, two of the five 
Justices in the prevailing anti-affirmative 
action majority-- Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
whose commitment to original understandings 
and practices is also a matter of 
record--should drop their categorical 
opposition to race-based affirmative action 
measures.”). 
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did in a few hours in the library) that the 
practice of permitting after-the-fact 
evaluation of ballots on a highly general 
intent of the voter standard, a practice 
constitutionally indistinguishable from the 
standard set forth by the Florida court, 
was extremely widespread in the period 
leading up to 1868, and indeed apparently 
unchallenged. 
The earliest important case that 
Justice Scalia might have regarded as the 
foundation of a tradition was decided in 
New York in 1827, People ex rel. Yates v. 
Ferguson.21  The question in Ferguson 
was whether ballots identifying “H.F. 
Yates” as the candidate chosen should be 
counted as votes for a candidate named 
Henry F. Yates.  In concluding that they 
could be so counted, the court noted that 
it was the practice of New York’s state 
elections board to count abbreviated 
names as valid votes for a candidate, 
despite the existence of a statute requiring 
a lawful ballot to contain the candidate’s 
name, when “the canvassers adjudge that 
the abbreviation represents the word, 
which word represents the name of the 
person voted for,” and that this practice 
was justifiable only because “the 
abbreviation is evidence of the intent of 
the voter.”  A fortiori, the court 
concluded, a jury hearing a case involving 
ambiguous ballots was entitled to consult 
whatever “testimony, facts and 
circumstances,” including the testimony 
of the voter himself, that would bear on 
the question for whom the voter intended 
to vote.22 
The Ferguson court’s holding that 
personal testimony was admissible to 
assist a jury in allocating an ambiguous 
                                                     
21  8 COW. 102 (N.Y. Supr. 1827). 
22  Id. at 107. 
ballot proved controversial.  Several other 
states rejected that specific element of 
Ferguson.23  In other respects, however, 
Ferguson was entirely typical of the 
decisions we have found from the four 
decades that separated Ferguson from the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The reported cases from that period seem, 
almost invariably, to expect elections 
boards to apply a non-formalistic and 
quite general standard in deciding how to 
count ambiguous ballots.24  The case that 
seems to have gone the furthest in 
imposing a judicially crafted rule on the 
discretion of local elections officials was 
People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott,25 a case 
                                                     
23  See, e.g., People ex rel. Attorney-
General v. Tisdale, 1 DOUG. 59, 63-64 (Mich. 
1843); Attorney General ex rel. Carpenter v. 
Ely, 4 Wis. 438, 449 (1854).  (The New York 
Court of Appeals itself later rejected the 
practice of permitting voters to testify as to 
their intentions.  See People v. Saxton, 22 
N.Y. 309, 311 (1860) (“The intention of the 
voter is to be inferred ... by a reasonable 
construction of his acts.”) 
24 See, e.g., Ferguson, 8 COW. at 106 
(without “confin[ing] themselves to names 
written or printed at full length ... [t]he intent 
of the voter is to be ascertained by the 
canvassers”); Tisdale, 1 DOUG. at 65 
(canvassers “were to ascertain that intention 
from the votes,” not permitting “a slight error” 
to “prevent the vote from being counted for 
the person for whom it was evidently 
intended”); Ely, 4 Wis. at 449 (voter’s intent 
may be “explained by the surrounding 
circumstances, from facts of a general public 
nature, connected with the election, and the 
different candidates, which may aid you in 
coming to the right conclusion”); State ex rel. 
Spaulding v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551 (1860); 
Day v. Kent, 1 Or. 123 (Oreg. Terr. 1854); 
People ex rel. Akin v. Matteson, 7 Peck 167 
(Ill. 1855). 
25 16 Mich. 283 (1868). 
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decided in Michigan in 1868, but even 
there the court acknowledged that 
canvassing officials should count 
imperfectly executed ballots where the 
ballot’s appearance was “sufficient to 
show an intent to vote against the one 
[candidate] and for the other.”26  
While it is clear that pre-1868 
judges were well aware of the danger that 
the officials responsible for counting 
ballots could err, by mistake or 
otherwise,27 we have found little 
suggesting that the courts of that era 
thought that the establishment of specific 
standards or uniform rules was necessary 
or even desirable in order to prevent such 
error.  As far as any court might go was to 
ban the use by elections officials of 
“extrinsic evidence,” by which was meant 
the consideration of other information 
besides that evident on the face of the 
ballots, interpreted in light of “such 
matters of public notoriety, as that certain 
well-known abbreviations are generally 
used to designate particular names, and 
the like.”28  In disputed elections that 
                                                     
26 Id. at 307. (opinion of Campbell, 
J.) (requiring elections officials to disallow 
ballots giving the candidate’s initials rather 
than his given names in full on the authority 
of Tisdale).  See also id. at 310 (opinion of 
Christiancy, J.) (concurring on the authority of 
Tisdale while questioning the rule “on 
principle”); id. at 317 (Cooley, C.J., dissenting 
in part) (regretting the court’s adherence to 
Tisdale “notwithstanding the majority are of 
opinion that it is unsound in principle”). 
27  See People ex rel. Hodgkinson v. 
Stevens, 5 Hill. 616, 626 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1843) 
(opinion of Nelson, C.J.) (“it is the duty of 
courts to restrain the doings of canvassers of 
elections strictly within the limits of the 
authority under which they act”). 
28  People v. Cook, 4 N.Y. 67, 81 
(1853). 
came before the courts, there was 
disagreement over the extent to which 
extrinsic evidence was admissible.29  
There, too, however, we have found little 
indication that any court believed it 
necessary to establish affirmative and 
specific guidelines to govern a jury’s 
judgment as to voter intention. 
The controlling goal, virtually 
every reported case agreed, was to 
determine correctly “the simple fact of the 
intention of the voters who cast their 
votes,”30, and as a general matter a voter’s 
failure to follow with precision statutory 
or customary rules about the form of his 
ballots was not permitted to defeat that 
intention where it could be discerned.31  
At the polls’ closing, as one court put it  
[t]he choice of the voters has 
become a perfect fixed fact.  To 
make proof of that fact is all that 
remains to be done.  Counting the 
votes and making the returns are 
not part of the election, but the 
mere steps of the agents of those 
who have voted, to make known 
the result.  Now, it must be evident 
                                                     
29 Compare Ely, 4 Wis. at 449-50 
(facts “connected with the election” 
admissible “for the purpose of aiding the jury 
in determining who was intended to be voted 
for”) with People ex rel. Lake, 3 Mich. 233, 
235 (1854) (such evidence properly excluded).   
30 Matteson, 7 Peck at 169 
31  See, e.g., id.  (“When we are 
satisfied on that point [sc. the voter’s intent], 
we are bound to give effect to such 
intention.”); Saxton, 22 N.Y. at 311 (voter’s 
intent to vote for candidate by writing in his 
name to be effectuated despite failure to strike 
out name of other candidate on printed ballot); 
State ex rel Philips v. Goldthwaite, 16 Wis. 
146 (1862). 
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that it is quite immaterial to the 
electors and the elected, whose 
rights are involved in the 
transaction, in what way the choice 
of the people is discovered, if the 
means used suffice to carry that 
choice into effect. . . .  Truth, if 
recognized, is not to be rejected 
because it comes through an 
imperfect channel.32 
Indeed, the most respected 
constitutionalist of the time, Thomas 
Cooley, addressed this issue only months 
before the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was proclaimed.  “The true 
rule upon this subject” is that “where the 
intent of the voter as expressed by his 
ballot, when considered in the light of 
such surrounding circumstances, is not 
doubtful, the ballot should be counted and 
allowed for the person intended.”33  In the 
case before him, the Michigan Supreme 
Court divided over whether canvassing 
officials could accept ballots that gave the 
initials rather than the full given name(s) 
of a candidate, with a majority believing 
itself bound by authority to require the 
rejection of such ballots.  As Chief Justice 
Cooley noted, however, the court left 
unquestioned as a general matter the 
power of local elections officials to count 
ballots where “the error of the voter is not 
so great, when the facts surrounding the 
election are considered, as to leave his 
intent in no real doubt.”  Cooley’s views 
were no aberration.  In the light of this 
fact, the Court had no basis whatever -- if 
the original, “time-dated” meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to govern -- for 
condemning as unconstitutional the 
Florida Supreme Court’s adoption a 
                                                     
32  Day, 1 Or. at 128.   
33  People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott, 
16 Mich. at 319-20 (1868). 
practice that was traditional at the time 
the amendment became part of the 
Constitution.34 
Perhaps there is some other way 
to read the 19th century cases than the one 
we have presented; possibly there are 
other cases or sources that could lead 
someone to a different conclusion than 
that expressed by Chief Justice Cooley.  
Justice Scalia, however, did not make 
such an argument.  In joining the per 
curiam opinion he simply ignored the 
very materials, the very question, that he 
has repeatedly defined as determinative 
for his own views on constitutional issues. 
                                                     
34  Two additional issues merit brief 
attention.  (1) Although most of the cases we 
have found do not deal with multi-district 
elections of the sort before the Court today, 
those that do give no indication that the courts 
deciding them perceived the difference to be 
significant with respect to dealing with 
ambiguous ballots.  See, e.g., People ex rel. 
Hodgkinson, 5 Hill 616 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1843); 
People ex rel. Lake, 3 Mich. 233 (1854).  (2) 
We have been able to discover no case dealing 
with a presidential election.  But see Ex parte 
Heath, 3 Hill 42 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1842) (stating 
in dicta that the principle of election law being 
applied “is the same, whether considered in 
reference to elections in municipal 
corporations, to county, district or state 
elections, or even a federal election for 
president”).  But there obviously is nothing 
whatever in the text of the equal protection 
clause or, for that matter, our precedents, that 
justifies treating a state’s duty to afford voters 
equal protection as any different when the 
election is for presidential electors than when 
it is for any other officials.  The distinction 
that the Supreme Court has drawn in the one 
person/one vote cases between congressional 
and state-legislative districting rests on the 
fact that congressional districting is controlled 
not by the equal protection clause but by 
Article I.  See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 
792-93 (1973). 
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Judge Posner who disapproved 
the Equal Protection analysis tendered in 
the per curiam opinion has advanced a 
pragmatic justification for the decision by 
Justice Scalia and the other two 
concurring Justices to join the per curiam 
opinion despite its transparent weakness 
and despite its inconsistency with the 
majority’s decision to stop the recount 
altogether.35  But in his view, the 
concurring Justices “had no real choice:” 
Had they not joined the equal 
protection ground, the outcome of 
the case would have been no 
different – a reversal terminating 
the recount – but there would have 
been a majority to reject both 
possible grounds for the reversal, 
the equal protection ground (which 
by hypothesis the three concurring 
Justices plus Stevens and Ginsburg 
would have voted against) and the 
Article II ground (which all but the 
three concurring Justices would 
have refused – in fact did refuse – 
to join).  What a field day the 
critics of Bush v. Gore would then 
have had!36 
In short, and on the assumption 
(which Posner does not examine) that the 
concurring Justices did not actually think 
the Equal Protection argument 
convincing, they nonetheless were 
justified in joining the per curiam opinion 
in order to reduce the Court’s (which is to 
say their own) vulnerability to criticism.  
                                                     
35  Id. at 128.  See also id. at 152 (“If 
the vice of the Florida supreme court’s 
decision ... was the standardless character of 
the recount that it ordered, the logical remedy 
was to direct that court to adopt standards [or] 
dismiss the suit.”). 
36  Id. at 168. 
This argument – that a justice properly 
may endorse a conclusion that he deems 
contrary to law in order to avoid (or 
reduce) unfavorable commentary on his 
“brethren”– may be sensible for someone 
like Chief Judge Posner who takes what 
he calls “a pragmatic approach to 
adjudication,” although it is important to 
note that what Posner is commending as 
“a bit of Realpolitik” is a deliberate 
refusal to obey the law or to be candid.37 
For us, concern for the Court’s 
reputation as a court of law pointed in the 
contrary direction of a refusal to hear the 
case.  By deciding it on the merits, the 
Court passed up an extraordinary 
opportunity to instruct the American 
people on the Court’s limited role in the 
constitutional scheme and the related 
responsibility of citizens to resolve such 
issues by democratic means.38  Such a 
decision would have created “a field day” 
for members of the profession seeking to 
persuade the people that the Court is 
indeed an institution of law and not 
merely, as many must always suspect, a 
mechanism for indulging the preferences 
of nine powerful individuals. 
                                                     
37  POSNER, BREAKING THE 
DEADLOCK 169.  The quotations are from a 
sarcastic criticism of Justice Breyer for not 
engaging in such Realpolitik. 
38 It would have been just the right 
occasion to quote James Bradley Thayer’s 
very wise advice on the need to remind the 
people “of the great range of possible mischief 
that our system leaves open, and must leave 
open,” because [u]nder no system can the 
power of courts go far to save a people from 
ruin.”  The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 156 (1893). 
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Justice Scalia, we are pleased to 
affirm is not a Posnerian pragmatist,39 nor 
one prone to govern his actions by 
considerations of public relations.  
Consistency in the application of an 
appropriate constitutional methodology 
may be of little importance to Posner, but 
it is crucial to Justice Scalia’s own 
conception of the proper judicial role.  
The very purpose of his “interpretive 
philosophy” lies “in the rejection of 
usurpatious new” principles of 
constitutional law.  “My fidelity to the 
methodology should be judged ... by cases 
discovering a novel constitutional right.”40  
That is, of course, precisely what the per 
curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore did -- 
“discover a novel constitutional right” to 
create a “usurpatious new” principle.  The 
fact that there may have been a different 
argument for reaching the same result in 
that particular case that was perhaps less 
vulnerable does not explain how a Justice 
committed to consistency as a primary 
judicial virtue could join in announcing 
such a novel and therefore illegitimate 
right.  As Justice Scalia wrote in United 
States v. Virginia: 
Besides its centrality to the rule of 
law in general, consistency has a 
                                                     
39  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique 
of History in Adjudication and Legal 
Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 595-96 
(2000): “The originalists of the present day, 
such as Justice Scalia, are reacting to the 
exercise of free-wheeling judicial discretion 
by the courts during the era of Earl Warren 
and, to only a slightly lesser extent, of his 
successor, Warren Burger. The originalists 
want to minimize judicial discretion and they 
have devised a kind of algorithmic mechanism 
for doing so.” 
40  Scalia, Response, in A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION 139. 
special role to play in judge-made 
law - both judge-pronounced 
common law and judge- 
pronounced determinations of the 
application of statutory and 
constitutional provisions. Legis- 
latures are subject to democratic 
checks upon their lawmaking. 
Judges less so, and federal judges 
not at all.  The only checks on the 
arbitrariness of federal judges are 
the insistence upon consistency and 
the application of the teachings of 
the mother of consistency, logic.41 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States does not sit to announce 
“unique” dispositions.  Its principal 
function is to establish 
precedent--that is, to set forth 
principles of law that every court in 
America must follow.  As we said 
only this Term, we expect both 
ourselves and lower courts to 
adhere to the “rationale upon which 
the Court based the results of its 
earlier decisions.” ...  That is the 
principal reason we publish our 
opinions.42 
THE CONCURRING OPINION: THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE II 
Not only did Justice Scalia join in 
the per curiam opinion refusing to 
consider the “time-dated” meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause, but he also 
signed a concurring opinion of Chief 
                                                     
41  Scalia, Assorted Canards, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. at 588. 
42  518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting), quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996) 
(emphasis added). 
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Justice Rehnquist that seems to us 
(notwithstanding Judge Posner’s defense 
of it) to flout the plain meaning of Article 
II of the Constitution.  That opinion 
proposed an alternative basis for the 
Court’s decision.  Article II, § 1, cl. 2, of 
the Constitution provides that “[e]ach 
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct,” its 
presidential electors.  The concurrence 
reasoned that the Florida court’s order of 
a recount of the undervote was so 
substantial a “depart[ure] from the 
legislative scheme” that it uncon- 
stitutionally encroached on Article II’s 
delegation of power to the Florida 
legislature to direct the manner in which 
presidential electors are to be appointed.43  
The concurring Justices therefore 
concluded that “[f]or these reasons, in 
addition to those given in the per curiam,” 
the Florida court order ought to be 
reversed.44 
Indeed, it could scarcely be more 
plain that the authors and ratifiers of 
Article Two regarded the selection of the 
state’s presidential electors to be in the 
first instance a task for the Florida 
legislature, but how the legislators chose 
to do this was their business.  They might, 
as far as the federal Constitution is 
concerned, have chosen to count no votes 
but their own as the elected repre-
sentatives of the people of Florida and 
have chosen electors according to their 
own preferences.  Of course, no state 
legislature has chosen this course for 
many years, presumably because the 
people of the state would promptly throw 
all the rascals out.  Like all other states, 
                                                     
43  531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring). 
44  Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring). 
therefore, Florida has chosen to engage 
the services of citizen voters, local 
governments, and the courts of the state 
for specific and varying roles in the 
selection of presidential electors.  Each of 
these bodies and institutions has a limited 
role and in the end the designation of 
presidential electors remains, as the 
Constitution provides, with the 
legislature.  
After ratification of the Fifteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments, Florida 
could not discriminate among voters on 
the basis of their race or gender, but these 
are the only textual provisions in the 
Constitution of the United States bearing 
on the states’ authority to choose their 
electors in a manner agreeable to its own 
elected representatives.  If, as Judge 
Posner and other defenders of the 
majority contend, the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Florida was lawless, 
the legislature remained free, insofar as 
federal law is concerned, to disregard that 
decision and certify presidential electors 
according to its own best judgment.  If the 
legislature was inhibited in following that 
course, the inhibitions came from the text 
of the Florida constitution and the fear of 
an adverse response of the people to a 
decision that they might have deemed 
illegitimate. 
Article II of the Constitution of 
the United States provides that the vote of 
each state’s electors is reported to the 
President of the United States Senate, and 
the votes are tabulated in a joint session of 
Congress.  The final authority for 
resolving a contested presidential election 
resides in the elected members of the 
United States House of Representatives. 
Just as it is plain that the primary 
responsibility rests with the Florida 
legislature, it is equally plain that the 
architects of the Constitution went to 
some trouble to avoid any invitation to the 
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life-tenured Justices to participate in the 
selection of the President.  The 
connecting thread in the constitutional 
system the Founders devised for choosing 
the President is that the bodies 
constitutionally entrusted with respon-
sibility are, in each instance, accountable 
to the people and can be dismissed from 
office if the commit the sin of self-
dealing.  If it were a good idea to involve 
the life-tenured Justices in picking the 
President who picks them, James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and their 
colleagues would have been smart enough 
to arrange that. 
There was, however, as we have 
noted, a compelling reason not to give 
Justices a role in Presidential elections.  
Of all the public officials in the United 
States other than the candidates 
themselves, those having the greatest 
personal stake in the outcome of a 
presidential election are the Justices of the 
Supreme Court.  The point is so obvious 
that it needed no discussion at 
Philadelphia, or in the Federalist Papers, 
or elsewhere when the Constitution was 
being debated.  Nor, it seemed to us, 
should it have been necessary to call this 
to the attention of a professed textualist 
such as Justice Scalia.45  Yet the point has 
                                                     
45  When the argument was made to 
the Court a few years ago that it could review 
the procedures by which the Senate tries 
judges who have been impeached, the Court 
dismissed the argument as “counterintuitive” 
because it would “place final reviewing 
authority with respect to impeachments in the 
hands of the same body that the impeachment 
process is meant to regulate.”  Bush v. Gore 
reached a conclusion equally at odds with 
“with the Framers’ insistence that our system 
be one of checks and balances” on the 
judiciary as well as on the political branches.  
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234-35 
(1993). 
received very little attention in the 
literature about the case. 
THE STAY ORDER 
Justice Scalia made a brief 
attempt to defend the Court’s December 9 
order temporarily staying the Florida 
recount three days before it decided that 
the count should be permanently stayed.  
He wrote that the stay was proper because 
“[c]ount first, and rule upon legality 
afterwards, is not a recipe for producing 
election results that have the public 
acceptance democratic stability re-
quires.”46  This sentence is both puzzling 
(counting the votes first and ruling upon 
the legal issues afterwards is the ordinary 
course of election-related litigation) and 
unintentionally revealing.  It is not in fact 
the task of the courts or the litigation 
process to “produce” election results or, 
for that matter, democratic stability in any 
direct sense.  The stability of democratic 
government depends primarily on 
democratic politics that assure citizens of 
the right and power to choose those 
making important public decisions and to 
discard self-aggrandizing public officers. 
Of the decisions made by the 
Court in Bush v. Gore, the stay order is 
the least defensible.  Even if there were 
substance to either of the constitutional 
arguments advanced in the per curiam and 
in the concurring opinions, there is no 
justification for the stay order except the 
realpolitik argument advanced by Judge 
Posner.  Self-serving realpolitik is the 
only possible explanation of the Scalia 
utterance with regard to the stay.  If 
indeed, the Florida court must supply 
detailed standards, it was for it to decide 
whether there was time to do so.  If 
                                                     
46  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 
1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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indeed, the issue is for the legislature 
under Article II, neither is that a reason 
for those with life tenure to stop the 
count. 
WHAT REMAINS OF 
SELF-GOVERNMENT? 
The fundamental point we wish to 
make regarding Justice Scalia’s behavior 
in Bush v. Gore has little to do with his 
(or any other Justice’s) personal failings 
or lapses in consistency.  Our reason for 
directing attention to his votes is that he 
was the Justice most likely to take 
seriously the duty to obey legal texts in an 
important case involving the power and 
self-interest of the Justices themselves, 
and thereby most likely to respect the 
institutions of self-government.  His 
disregard of that duty reveals the Court as 
an arrogant band of men and women 
having scant respect for representative 
government. 
In the situation before the Court, 
the Constitution on its face provided for a 
political means of resolving the Florida 
vote controversy and, thus, the 
presidential election.  If the recount had 
continued under the Florida court’s 
December 8 order, the ballots would have 
been recounted as ballots have 
traditionally been counted in this country, 
by hand and on a local basis by officials 
having no direct personal stake in the 
outcome, and under a standard that is both 
traditional and the one ordained by the 
Florida legislature.  It was that legislature, 
after all, and not the state supreme court, 
which created the rule that “[n]o vote 
shall be declared invalid or void if there is 
a clear indication of the intent of the voter 
as determined by the canvassing board.”47  
                                                     
47  Fla. St. § 101.5614. 
Furthermore, accepting for the sake of 
argument the concurrence’s insistence 
that Article II vests the state legislature 
with the sole and curiously undelegable 
power to determine how a state’s electors 
are to be appointed, there is – as noted -- 
no reason to doubt that the Florida 
legislature retained the power to select a 
slate of electors whatever the result of a 
recount – and indeed the legislature was 
on the verge of doing so when the 
Supreme Court relieved it of further 
responsibility. 
In any event, and regardless of 
what came out of Florida, under Article II 
and the Twelfth Amendment, the joint 
session of both houses of Congress in the 
first instance, and the House of 
Representatives in the event the electoral 
vote count in the joint session did not 
produce an electoral college victor, had 
the textually committed power to 
determine who was elected President.48  
The Court appears to have found it 
intolerable to permit the election 
controversy to be resolved by these who 
were elected to resolve it and who would 
have to risk the displeasure of voters if 
they resolved it wrong, despite the fact 
that it was overwhelmingly likely that the 
result would be to place Governor Bush in 
the White House.  (This latter point is 
overlooked by those who focus narrowly 
on the apparently partisan – five 
Republicans outvote four Democrats – 
nature of the decision.)  The danger or 
unseemliness or undesirability of a 
resolution by persons accountable to the 
people was so pressing in their minds that 
                                                     
48  See POSNER, BREAKING THE 
DEADLOCK 184-85 (constitutional issues 
arising from the joint session’s decisions on 
counting the electoral votes probably would 
have been political questions unreviewable by 
the courts). 
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resolution by the Court appeared 
preferable even though it produced the 
bizarre result that the Court itself 
determined which candidate would be 
vested with the power to appoint its 
members. 
There is nothing new in the 
observation that members of the Court, 
other members of the judiciary, and 
prominent members of the profession 
often display in their decisions an 
alienated disdain for the processes of 
American democratic politics.49  What is 
significant about Justice Scalia’s behavior 
in Bush v. Gore is that it shows how deep 
this resistance to decision by political 
means has become.  Even an elaborate, 
publicly professed “interpretive 
philosophy” takes a back seat, it seems, to 
the impulse to displace the messiness of 
politics with the ostensible reasonability 
and order of judicial decision-making 
when it comes to deciding a case of 
elevated personal interest to the Justices. 
As in many other situations where 
(in our judgment, at any rate) the Supreme 
Court has usurped power properly lodged 
in the political branches or in the states, it 
appears that the Court got away with Bush 
v. Gore.50  There is, at present, no 
substantial body of opinion, either among 
                                                     
49  The point has been made by each 
of us, among others.  See CARRINGTON, 
STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY (1999); POWELL, 
THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993). 
50  See Herbert M. Kritzer, The 
Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions 
and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 
JUDICATURE 33, 37 (2001) (although 
“Republicans became more supportive and 
Democrats ... less,” “the net effect on the 
public’s evaluation [of the Court] is 
essentially nil”). 
the public generally or in the legal 
profession or the academy (where most 
constitutional law scholars support an 
expansive role for the Court) that objects 
in a systematic fashion to the Court’s 
enthusiasm for self-aggrandizing counter-
majoritarianism, and for understandable 
reasons.  While individual decisions of 
the Court anger significant numbers of 
people with some frequency, as an overall 
matter the Court’s decisions keep it 
reasonably close to the political center of 
gravity of an economically privileged 
ruling class.  The legal profession in 
America is very large and very powerful 
and its members seem to perceive that 
their status and power is somehow linked 
to that of the Justices.  The long-standing 
and deep-seated reverence most 
Americans feel for the Republic’s basic 
system of government will probably 
therefore continue to shelter the Court 
from the consequences one might 
otherwise expect when a governmental 
institution in a democracy becomes self-
centered.  For most Americans, the 
concerns that we raise about decisional 
integrity and respect for representative 
government seem too abstract, too 
bloodless to raise any sustained passion. 
Indeed, there appears to us to be a 
false sense that it is uncivil and 
unprofessional as well as unpatriotic to 
call attention to self-aggrandizement by 
the Justices.  Perhaps because they do 
their work in a building designed to 
resemble a pagan temple, many who must 
know better seem reluctant to call 
attention to the Court’s self-dealing.  We 
sense among lawyers a special 
unwillingness to recognize the reality of 
what the Court did. 
Perhaps we are less than civil in 
calling attention to that reality.  However, 
the costs to American society of 
permitting the Court to behave as it did in 
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Bush v. Gore seem real to us.  There are 
occasions when incivility is a public duty. 
The Court’s membership is drawn 
from a narrow segment of American 
society, and its perception of public 
policy bears the stamp of that narrow 
class’s interests and concerns.51  
Moreover, widespread acceptance of 
judicial politics “erod[es] the habits and 
temperament of representative democ-
racy.”52  The honor, gratification, and 
                                                     
51  To document this assertion is a 
task for another day, but consider as an 
example the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  
Roughly speaking, what the Court has done is 
create a regime in which (a) anyone with 
access to upper middle-class finances can 
obtain an abortion, although (b) in any 
individual state a significant number of 
obstacles to doing so (which 
disproportionately affect poorer women) can 
be imposed, and (c) government need not fund 
abortions so that the well to do need not 
subsidize the poor on this matter.  As many 
other commentators have observed, this 
constellation of outcomes, however the 
Justices consciously arrived at it, perfectly 
mirrors the selfish interests of well to do 
Americans.  
 
responsibility of those holding elective 
office are diminished.  And so, also, are 
the honor, gratification, and responsibility 
associated with the performance of one’s 
duty as a citizen to vote on important 
matters.  Even before Bush v. Gore, the 
Court had made itself the central issue in 
six consecutive presidential elections, 
limiting the ability of those seeking 
popular support from gaining public 
attention on public issues worthy of 
discussion.  The decision in that case thus 
accelerates the degradation of all public 
offices outside the life-tenured federal 
judiciary and enhances the sense of 
citizens that they are not the masters of 
the Republic. 
We do not suggest that elected 
representatives of the people make wise 
decisions.  Often they do not.  The great 
advantage of having disputes resolved by 
them and not by the Court is that the 
people share in the responsibility for 
decisions made by those they choose and 
they can throw the rascals out when they 
do the wrong thing.  Even if those elites 
serving with life tenure have better 
judgment than the people or their 
representatives,  -- and we do not concede 
that they do -- they cannot provide either 
of those very great advantages that are the 
source of the stabilizing effect of 
democratic government. 
We note that a similar 
degradation of democratic traditions is 
occurring in other countries in which high 
courts are seeking to emulate the Supreme 
Court of the United States.53  The 
                                                                     
52 F. L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, 
THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT 
PARTY 149 (2000). 
53 See also HAIG PATAPAN, JUDGING 
DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF THE 
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA (Cambridge UK 
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observations of F.L. Morton and Rainer 
Knopff about the expanding political role 
of the Canadian courts are equally 
applicable to this country: 
The growth of courtroom rights 
talk undermines perhaps the 
fundamental prerequisite of decent 
liberal democratic politics: the 
willingness to engage those with 
whom one disagrees in the ongoing 
attempt to combine diverse 
interests into temporarily viable 
governing minorities.  Liberal 
democracy works only when 
majorities rather than minorities 
rule, and when it is obvious to all 
that ruling majorities are 
themselves coalitions of minorities 
in a pluralistic society.  Partisan 
opponents, in short, must 
nevertheless be seen as fellow 
citizens who might be future allies.  
Representative institutions facilitate 
this fundamental democratic 
disposition; judicial power 
undermines it.54 
Returning constitutional law and 
the Court to their proper, limited roles in 
American democracy would not be easy.  
But it cannot be done at all if the Court is 
free to interfere with the Republic’s 
fundamental democratic processes with 
the acceptance and approval of the legal 
                                                                     
2000); KATE MALLESON, THE NEW 
JUDICIARY: THE EFFECTS OF EXPANSION AND 
ACTIVISM (Ashgate 1999); U. C. JAIN & 
JEEVAN NAIR, JUDICIARY IN INDIA 140-259 
(Jaipur 2000).  Judging from these works, it 
appears that the Brennan vision of the anti-
democratic role of the judiciary is infectious 
among English-speaking judges. 
54  MORTON & KNOPFF, note 51, at 
129.  
profession and the academy, and if 
individual Justices are not held 
accountable in public discussion when 
they disregard their own expressed 
principles out of a disdain for democratic 
politics and an ambition to protect and 
enhance their own individual powers. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States, the political 
legitimacy of courts exercising judicial 
review is settled and we do not mean to 
suggest that this feature of our system 
should or could be abolished, although we 
do believe that current practice goes 
beyond what can be justified.  American 
courts ought exercise their powers of 
judicial review only in the democratic 
tradition in which majoritarian political 
decision-making is the norm.  Even when 
they displace such decisions, those with 
life tenure have no commission to do so 
other than on the basis of constitutional 
norms that themselves were the product of 
majoritarian political processes. 
“It is quite impossible for the 
courts, creatures and agents of the people 
of the United States,” Justice Scalia 
affirmed, “to impose upon those people of 
the United States norms that those people 
themselves (through their democratic 
institutions) have not accepted.”55  
Unfortunately, such impositions are by no 
means impossible, only antidemocratic 
and wrong.  And especially wrong, it 
seems to us, when the effect is self-
aggrandizing enhancement of the personal 
power and status of the Justices 
themselves. 
If there be readers who are able 
and willing to explain why the decision in 
                                                     
55  Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. at 1122. 
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Bush v. Gore was not manifest self-
aggrandizement, or who are able and 
willing to explain to us how that decision 
can be reconciled with a republican form 
of government, we would be grateful for 
their illumination. 
